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Abstract 
In this paper we address the study of the effects of product line diversification on firm 
performance in the mobile application market. Specifically, we shed light on whether the 
distribution platform ecosystem where developers commercialize their apps influence the 
effect of product line diversification, i.e., diversification across different app categories, on 
developer sales performance. To these purposes, we compare the sales performance of 
diversified developers with that of category-specialized developers in the two major app 
stores (namely, Apple’s App Store and Google Play). Our results show that the diversification 
strategy has a positive impact on developer sales in Google Play, while no significant impact 
emerges in the Apple’s App Store. The cross-platform differences in consumer willingness to 
pay are the rationale behind the different effect of diversification on sales performance across 
platform ecosystems. Our results have an important implication for developers as they suggest 
that developers should factor in the app ecosystem where they operate when making the 
decision on whether to diversify or not.  
 
Keywords: Diversification, Mobile App Market, Distribution Platforms, Ecosystems, 
Empirical analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
There is considerable disagreement about the effects of corporate diversification on the firm 
financial performance, and how and when this strategy can be used to build competitive 
advantage (Markides and Williamson, 1994; Palich et al., 2000). For instance, a copious body 
of the financial literature believes that corporate diversification will result in a reduction in 
value for shareholders (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lang and Stulz, 1994). In contrast, other 
studies in the same literature provide evidence that numerous diversified firms are traded at a 
premium, and not at a discount (Villalonga, 2004). In line with the existence of opposing 
views, some studies document notable heterogeneity of price reactions following the 
announcement of diversification processes (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000; Santalo and 
Becerra, 2008). 
Divergent views also exist about the impact of product line diversification on firm 
performance. In spite of the rise of organizational diseconomies and internal capital market 
inefficiencies (Grant et al., 1988; Markides, 1992; Palich et al., 2000), firm could gain a 
number of benefits from product line diversification. Firms can take advantage of economies 
of scope by increasing the utilization of certain resources, i.e., brand, focused technologies, 
that cannot be sold externally due to high transaction costs and other market imperfections 
(Markides, 1992; Markides and Williamson, 1994). By means of diversification, firms also 
become more able to reduce the firm’s overall risk (Berger and Ofek, 1995). Economic theory 
also suggests that diversification can deliver benefits related to enhanced market power. For 
instance, in the long-term diversified firms could benefit from the adoption of predatory 
pricing strategy for certain products as they can more easily sustain short-term losses through 
product cross-subsidization (Saloner 1987; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Aribarg and Arora, 2008). 
Moreover, by diversifying their product offering, firms can better exploit the opportunity to 
serve consumers with different preferences and needs (Quelch and Kenny, 1994) and, in turn, 
the ability to reduce the risk associated with the uncertainty of future preferences and demand 
for each line. Despite the existence of numerous benefits associated with product line 
diversification, some firms may feel more advantageous to focus on narrow product lines in 
order to achieve economies through reductions in production, design and inventory costs, and 
especially to favor the development and the consolidation of specific skills enabling the 
creation of superior products (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011; Boh et al., 2007; 
Mukhopadhyay et al., 2011). 
	 3	
While there exists consolidated literature on both corporate and product line types of 
diversification, some recent studies (e.g., Santalo and Becerra, 2008) point out that whether 
the diversification strategy has a positive or negative impact on firm performance depends on 
the industry where the firm operates. This implies that the competitive environment where 
firms compete plays an important role in shaping the relationship between diversification and 
firm performance. Therefore, from a practical viewpoint, the study of specific industries is 
important to deliver information that can be utilized by practitioners in their strategic 
decisions. Also, from a theoretical viewpoint, the argument that the competitive environment 
where firms operate can influence the performance-diversification relationship opens up room 
for enhancing the understanding of which environment features are likely to play a role in 
such relationship. In this paper we address the study of the effects of product line 
diversification on firm performance in a peculiar (and novel) industry, namely the mobile 
application (hereafter, app) market. To the best of our knowledge, there are only very few 
studies examining the impact on performance of a product line diversification strategy in the 
app market. For example, Lee and Raghu (2014) find that broadening app offerings across 
multiple categories is a key determinant that contributes to a higher probability of survival in 
the top charts. This finding hints at the existence of a positive relationship between inter-
category diversification and developer sales performance. We further examine the impact of 
diversification on developer performance. Specifically, we endeavor to shed light on whether 
an important environment feature, i.e., the distribution platform ecosystem where developers 
commercialize their apps influence the effect of product line diversification (intended to be as 
diversification across different app categories) on developer sales performance. An app store 
can be indeed viewed as an online platform ecosystem where multiple parties (app users, 
developers, OS/device makers, platform owners) can interact. As a matter of fact, in an app 
store, users can download and rate apps developed by third parties (i.e., developers) for 
mobile devices and operating systems (OS) supported by the platform. In particular, the 
unique relationship between the mobile OS/device market and the app market creates 
significant differences in the type of consumers accessing different platforms. Indeed, once 
consumers choose their favorite OS/mobile device (e.g., Apple or Android), they are locked 
in by this decision, as they rely exclusively on the sponsored platform to source their apps. 
This implies that the customer base in a given platform strictly depends on the customer base 
of the associated product, i.e., the mobile device and the relative OS. Different mobile device 
makers and/or OS providers naturally target different segments based on their product quality 
and marketing capabilities. As a result, developers are likely to face significantly different 
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consumer segments in different distribution platform ecosystems. For instance, Apple targets 
exclusively the (loyal) high-end of the market, whereas the sales of Android devices are 
mostly fueled by low-end segments of the market (Hixon 2014; Ghose and Han 2014). As 
result of the emergence of these cross-platform differences, we posit that, the effect of product 
line diversification on developer sales performance should vary across different platform 
ecosystems. Therefore, we contribute to the extant literature on diversification by adding one 
important factor that can shape the relationship between diversification and firm performance, 
namely the distribution platform ecosystem. 
We contribute from a practical perspective as well. Indeed, according to Venturebeat, the app 
market has shown an astonishing growth stepping from less than $10 billion annual revenue 
in 2011 up to estimated $70 billion by 2017 (Takahashi, 2014). Nowadays, apps are 
commercialized mostly in two app distribution platforms, namely Apple’s App Store and 
Google Play, which account together for almost 90% of the market (Gartner, 2013) and offer 
business opportunities to a multitude of developers across the globe. In a highly dynamic and 
competitive environment, app developers need to make a number of decisions crucial for their 
profitability. One of them certainly relates to the choice of the type and the number of apps to 
market. Particularly, app developers face the strategic decision to specialize in a few (maybe 
one) app categories or diversify among a large number of app categories. Therefore, shedding 
light on how a diversification strategy impacts on their sales performance and how the 
diversification-performance relationship hinges upon the platform ecosystem where 
developers operate can provide useful guidelines to help them make better diversification (or 
specialization) decisions.   
To our purposes, we compare the sales performance of diversified developers (i.e., a 
developers marketing apps in different categories) with that of category-specialized 
developers in the two major app stores (Apple’s App Store and Google Play) and examine 
whether the app store ecosystem (Apple vs. Google) in which developers operate plays an 
important role in the relationship between diversification and sales performance. By way of 
anticipation, our results show that the diversification strategy has a positive impact on 
developer sales in Google Play, while no significant impact emerges in the Apple’s App 
Store. Essentially, diversified developers are associated with a better sales performance than 
specialized developers in Google Play, whereas in the Apple’s App Store, diversified 
developers do not seem to differ from specialized developers in terms of sales performance. 
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We connect these results to the cross-platform differences in consumer willingness to pay, 
which naturally influences the comparative advantages and disadvantages of diversification 
versus specialization. 
The paper unfolds as follows. In § 2 we present the theoretical background behind our 
hypotheses. In § 3 we describe the dataset, the variables and the methods utilized in this 
paper. We present and discuss the results in § 4. Finally, § 5 concludes.   
2. Theory and hypotheses 
In line with some previous studies (e.g., Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008; Lee and Raghu, 2014), 
given the absence of cost information, we rely on sales as a measure of firm performance, and 
accordingly our arguments on the advantages and/or disadvantages of diversification need to 
reflect the implications of diversification on such measure of performance. In this regard, we 
argue that app development and commercialization across multiple categories may have some 
advantages from sales perspective. First, consistent with the theories of product line 
extensions (Rothaermel et al., 2006), serving heterogeneous consumer demands helps reduce 
the uncertainty associated with demand variability. That is, the demand reduction in a certain 
category can be compensated by an increase in another category. Second, enhanced market 
power via diversification can also have a positive influence on sales (Saloner 1987; Berger 
and Ofek, 1995; Aribarg and Arora, 2008). As explained, in the long-term diversified firm 
could benefit from the adoption of predatory pricing strategy for certain products as they can 
more easily sustain short-term losses through product cross-subsidization (Saloner 1987; 
Berger and Ofek, 1995; Aribarg and Arora, 2008). Moreover, by diversifying their product 
offering, developers can take advantage of the consumer base already installed for a certain 
product line when introducing a new product line. This helps fuel the “bandwagon effect”, 
which is particularly relevant for the diffusion of information goods (Tanriverdi and Lee, 
2008). 
However, in spite of the benefits above and the additional cost-related advantages entailed for 
instance by the reuse of code components for some common functions (Haefliger et al., 
2008), the specificity of each category in terms of content and functionality may require 
developers to develop a great variety of coding skills and other resources necessary for the 
development and commercialization of different apps. For instance, applications in the 
navigation category require frequent map updates, which calls for strong support from the 
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server. In contrast, games app may not need a high-end server coding, but still they require 
sophisticated designs, user interface, and the creation of the game. This suggests that, in 
comparison with a specialized developer, a diversified developer may not be able to develop 
the same level of expertise necessary to create high-quality products able to succeed in the 
market. This is because the diversified developer has to distribute the efforts for the 
realization of very different applications (Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 2010).  
Because of the existence of counteracting forces, the ultimate effect of diversification on sales 
performance is unclear. Particularly, we argue that such effect may be significantly influenced 
by the ecosystem (Apple vs. Google) in which developers operate. Some recent studies in the 
financial literature (e.g., Santalo and Becerra, 2008) have shown that whether corporate 
diversification can create or destroy value strongly depends on the industry characteristics 
(specifically, the prevalence of diversified vs. specialized firms). By following this argument, 
we advance that in the app market whether product line diversification yields a better sales 
performance than product line specialization depends on the distribution platform ecosystem 
where developers operate. Specifically, we posit that, in Google Play ecosystem, developers 
who have chosen to diversify across multiple app categories should display a higher sales 
performance than specialized developers. In contrast, we argue that this should not be the case 
in the Apple ecosystem.  
The rationale is that in Google Play, consumers have lower average willingness to pay (Ghose 
and Han, 2014). Therefore, to increase sales, developers operating in this store need to capture 
a large market base (comparatively speaking). According to Tanriverdi and Lee (2008), 
diversified developers can “exploit” the consumer base already installed for a certain app 
category also for other app categories, fueling the “bandwagon effect” in the diffusion of apps 
across categories. This advantage is, of course, precluded to specialized developers. In 
addition, in Google Play specialized developers cannot counterbalance much this 
disadvantage with the specialization-related benefit of commercializing higher quality (and 
thus higher prices) apps because consumers in this ecosystem are less receptive to highly 
priced apps as compared to the Apple’s App Store. This implies that a diversification strategy 
should be preferred to a specialization strategy in this store. In contrast, in the Apple’s App 
Store, the presence of higher consumer willingness to pay provides higher incentive to 
develop higher quality (and thus higher price) apps (Ghose and Han, 2014), and thus monetize 
on margins. Through specialization, developers operating in this store can build expertise that 
	 7	
will allow them to develop and commercialize high quality apps more effectively. In contrast, 
this is more difficult to obtain through product line diversification as in this case development 
and commercialization efforts are distributed across a number of different applications. 
Therefore, in the Apple’s App Store, the advantages of specialization (i.e., higher quality 
products) are likely to compensate the advantages of diversification (i.e., higher user base). 
Accordingly, we formulate the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Diversified developers do not display higher sales performance than 
specialized developers in the Apple App Store.  
Hypothesis 2: Diversified developers display higher sales performance than specialized 
developers in Google Play.  
3. Data & Methods 
3.1 Data 
To test our hypotheses, we use data preliminarily collected in a period between March 9th, 
2013 and June 7th, 2014 from the two major app stores, namely Apple App Store and Google 
Play. Specifically, we consider all apps of developers ranked (with at least one app) in the top 
1000 grossing app ranking (i.e., the ranking of 1000 apps generating the highest revenue) in 
the above time span. As revenues are not publicly available, to compute them for each 
developer in our sample we use the procedure suggested by Garg and Telang (2013). 
Essentially, this procedure allows to infer daily app sales from daily app ranks by means of 
the well-known power law function relationship estimation (Brynjolfsson et al., 2003, 
Chevalier and Goolsbee, 2003). This procedure differs from previous approaches in that it 
does not need real sales data to estimate the parameters of the power law function. Indeed, 
Garg and Telang (2013) take advantage from the fact that several (inter-related) top app 
rankings are provided by app stores. Specifically, laying out a system of power law 
relationships between daily sales and daily ranks for top grossing, top paid and top free apps 
rankings allows to estimate the parameters necessary to compute the sales (with no need of 
retrieving data on real sales). The procedure can be easily extended to incorporate revenue 
from free apps (e.g., advertising revenue streams) and in-app purchase, thus allowing the 
estimation of all revenue streams that an app can generate. For more details on the procedure, 
the reader can refer to Garg and Telang (2013). In this paper we strictly follow this procedure 
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to estimate the daily app revenue, obtaining results quite similar to those obtained by Garg 
and Telang (2013). The outcome of this procedure, i.e., the estimates of daily app sales for 
each developer in both stores, is the starting point of our analysis.1  
Note that the apps considered in our sample are not only those appearing in the top 1000 
grossing app rankings of the two stores, but they include also those not featured in these 
rankings, but still developed by a developer able to bring at least one app in one of the two top 
grossing rankings. The reason is clearly due to the fact that we need to consider all revenue 
components for each developer to properly examine the role of diversification on the sales 
performance. Excluding some apps for a developer would lead to inaccurate revenue 
estimates. Essentially, monitoring the top 1000 grossing app rankings allows us to identify 
successful developers, to be intended as those able to bring at least one app in one the two top 
grossing rankings. All apps commercialized by these developers are considered in our sample. 
The choice of relying on top app rankings is consistent with prior research analyzing the app 
market (e.g., Carare 2012; Garg and Telang 2013). There are several important reasons for 
why all studies consider top app rankings. First, these rankings are easily available from the 
app stores. Second, the insights obtained from studying successful apps and developers, rather 
than average apps and developers, can be certainly more useful to developers that are 
planning the development and marketing of new apps. Third and most important, although 
both App Store and Google Play count more than one million applications available for 
download, the actual number of apps that are displayed to consumers is much more limited. In 
both stores consumers have access only to web pages displaying top rankings (e.g., top free, 
top paid, top grossing) for all apps, top rankings within each app category or top new entries 
and sponsored apps. Essentially only the very top portion of the app market is actually visible 
to consumers. This implies that top rankings are arguably the primary source of information 
not only for researchers to study this novel market, but also for consumers to make their 
purchase decisions, as highlighted also by Carare (2012). Finally, our choice of observing 
apps and developers in a time span of about four months is in line with previous studies on the 
app market (Carare 2012; Garg and Telang 2013). In particular, it is in line with Lee and 
Raghu (2014), who first study the performance implications of diversification in the app 
market.  
																																																													
1 The details of this preliminary estimation analysis are available from the authors. 
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Naturally, given that we examine the effect of developers’ diversification on their sales 
performance, the developer is our unit of analysis, and some characteristics are observed for 
each developer on daily basis during the period of observation. This implies that the daily app 
sales related to the same developer are aggregated on a daily basis for each developer. In a 
time span of 120 days, our initial sample encompasses more that 3,500 apps developed by 416 
developers in the two stores. To properly compare diversified developers with specialized 
developers, we are forced to remove from the analysis some developers. Therefore, our final 
sample includes 45,444 observations related to 386 developers. Specifically, in our final 
sample we count 24,886 observations related to 209 developers commercializing apps in the 
Apple’s App Store and 20,558 observations related to 177 developers in Google Play. Since 
we are interested in the performance implications of product line diversification, it is useful to 
point out that the above observations are related to 20 categories, namely Books & 
Consulting, Customization, Education, Entertainment, Finance, Games, Healthcare & Fitness, 
Lifestyle, Medicine, Music, Navigation, News, Photo & Video, Productivity, Social 
Networking, Sports, Tools, Travel, Utilities, and Weather. In our study, developers 
commercializing apps in more than one of these categories are considered diversified, 
whereas those focusing on apps belonging only to one of these categories are considered 
specialized. This is consistent with the definition of product line diversification as apps 
belonging to different categories satisfy different sets of consumer needs. Finally, our sample 
is an unbalanced panel dataset as some developers were able to bring at least one app in the 
top 1000 app ranking of the given store only during the period of observation. Thus, we count 
a lower number of observations for these developers as compared with those developers able 
to bring at least one app in the top 1000 app ranking of the given store since the beginning of 
our period of observation.  
3.2 Variables 
Dependent variable  
To properly compare the sales performance of diversified developers with that of specialized 
developers we need to identify a measure of sales performance that rules out the trivial 
differences between diversified and specialized developers. To do so, we adopt the standard 
chop-shop approach (Lang and Schulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Santalo and Becerra, 
2008). In our setting, this consists of adjusting the revenues of diversified developers in order 
to ensure a correct comparison with nondiversified developers. Specifically, for each 
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diversified developer we compute the ratio between the actual daily revenue generated by the 
developer (estimated by using Garg and Telang (2013) procedure) and a “what would be” 
daily revenue of the same developer. The latter is computed as the weighted average of the 
daily revenue the developer would generate if he were a specialized developer in each 
category in which he develops apps. The daily revenue in each category is simply the average 
revenue of all specialized developers in the category in the given day. The weights are given 
by the ratio between the daily revenue of the diversified developer in the given category and 
the developer’s total daily revenue. For specialized developers, the computation is similar 
except for the fact that only one category is naturally considered. The ratio between the actual 
daily revenue and the “what would be” daily revenue is essentially a category-adjusted 
measure of performance. Our dependent variable for each developer is the logarithm of this 
ratio (i.e., Category-adjusted Developer Sales Performance Ratio) computed above for 
diversified and specialized developers, respectively. In Table 1, we report the descriptive 
statistics of this ratio (with no logarithmic transformation). It can be noted that this ratio is on 
average equal to 5.495, thus implying that the actual revenue is more than five times higher 
than the “what would be” revenue. Given that by construction this ratio is on average equal to 
one for specialized developers, there could be an overall positive effect of diversification on 
sales performance. However, it is interesting that, while being higher than one for both stores, 
this ratio is much higher in Google Play than in the Apple’s App Store (7.855 vs. 3.547), thus 
hinting at the existence of an effect of the distribution platform ecosystem on the relationship 
between diversification and sales performance. We will unravel these aspects by using more 
appropriate instruments than simple descriptive statistics.  
Main independent variables 
Diversification: in line with the prior literature (e.g., Santalo and Becerra, 2008) we  introduce 
a dummy variable (Diversification) equal to one if the given developer is diversified in the 
given day, and equal to zero if specialized. As discussed earlier, developers commercializing 
apps in more than one category are considered diversified, whereas those focusing on apps 
belonging only to one category are considered specialized. Table 1 shows that approximately 
twenty percent of the observations are related to diversified developers and there are no 
differences between the two major stores. This suggests that during our period of observation 
the inter-category diversification strategy was actually chosen by a minority of developers in 
both stores. To test whether the effect of diversification on sales performance is influenced by 
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the store where the developer operates, one approach we undertake is to introduce in the 
regression model the interaction between the diversification dummy and a variable (namely, 
Store) equal to one if the given developer in the given day is observed in Apple’s App Store, 
zero if observed in Google Play.  
Control variables 
Developer concentration in an app category: in line with previous studies (Santalo and 
Becerra, 2008; Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008) we control for the level of developer concentration 
within each app category in the given store by computing and introducing a daily measure of 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), namely Category HHI. The level of developer 
concentration (and thus the level of developer competition) within a category is indeed an 
important category characteristic that can affect the sales performance of both diversified and 
specialized firms, thus needs to be controlled for. In our study, this measure is obtained by 
computing the market shares as the daily revenue of each developer appearing, with at least 
one app, in the top 1000 grossing apps of the given store on the given day divided by the total 
revenue of all the developers featured in the top 1000 grossing app ranking of the same store 
on the same day. We recognize that this measure does not take into account all developers 
commercializing apps in the given category in the given store on a given day. However, as 
explained earlier, the vast majority of apps and developers are never displayed on the pages of 
the two stores. Therefore, it is not possible to retrieve time-varying information on the sales of 
all developers in a category and a platform. With a multitude of apps “invisible” to 
consumers, the majority of developers of such apps are never a threat to developers of top 
apps. Therefore, our measure of developer concentration is likely to be an accurate measure of 
the level of competition with a category in a given store as the major threats for a developer 
are likely to come from successful developers, i.e., from developers able to feature their apps 
in the top 1000 grossing rankings. From Table 1, we observe that the level of developer 
concentration within category is not high (the average is overall 0.141), thus confirming that, 
at least among successful developers, the competition within category tends to be fierce, with 
no relevant differences between the two platforms. 
Store sales growth rate: in line with Tanriverdi and Lee (2008), we also control for the daily 
growth rate of the total sales generated in the app store where the given developer competes 
(namely, Store Sales Growth Rate) to account for the intuitive fact that a growing (shrinking) 
market can result in a better (worse) firm sales performance. From Table 1, we observe that 
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the store sales level is relatively stable with an average growth rate almost equal to zero in 
both stores, and a slightly more pronounced standard deviation. 
Developer prior sales: we control for the prior sales performance of a developer as in a 
relatively short period of observation the sales performance is likely to be persistent. That is, 
the previous sales performance of a developer can influence its subsequent sales performance 
(Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008). Given that we have estimates on developer sales at our disposal 
for the entire period of observation, we compute the prior sales of each developer in the given 
store by simply lagging the developer sales. In particular, we introduce the revenue generated 
in the previous seven days as our measure of developer prior sales (namely, Developer Prior 
Sales).2 
Developer age: we control for the developer age in the given store by computing and 
introducing a variable, namely Developer Age, which indicates the number of days a 
developer has been marketing apps in the given store since its first app commercialization. 
Firm age is naturally associated with firm performance as it reflects the experience and the 
knowledge maturated by the firm in the given market (Stern and Henderson, 2004; Tanriverdi 
and Lee, 2008). In fact, developers mature most of their experience from both technical and 
managerial perspectives by means of a learning by doing process (Argote e Miron-Spektor 
2011; Boh et al. 2007; Mukhopadhyay et al. 2011; Singh et al. 2011). Developers need indeed 
to become familiar with the software development kit provided by the platform in order to 
develop good apps that can succeed in the market. For these reasons, it appears clear that, 
ceteris paribus, a developer that has marketed apps in the given store for longer time is more 
likely to be successful. Therefore, controlling for the developer age helps capture the possible 
effect of experience on the measure sales performance. From Table 1, we observe that 
developer age is almost two years (687 days) on average. In this case, there are notable 
differences between Apple’s App Store and Google Play as developer age in the latter store 
tends to be (almost) half of that in the former store, consistent with the argument that 
developers usually target the Apple’s App Store first. 
Brand notoriety: we take into account the extent of developer notoriety by including a dummy 
(namely, Brand notoriety), which is equal to one if the brand/developer of the given app is 
worldwide established, zero otherwise. We identify a list of 36 top developers in our sample 
based on corporate revenue information and worldwide brand recognition. For instance, this 
																																																													
2 Note that our results are fully robust when lagging developer sales differently. 
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list includes mobile app divisions of Adobe Systems, Apple, Disney, Electronic Arts, 
Gameloft, Marvel Entertainment, Sega, TomTom International, Zynga, among others. 
Temporal dummies: to control for any daily factor common to all developers that could affect 
their sales performance we introduce in the model one dummy for each day of observation.  
Table 2 reports the correlation matrix, which suggests no serious degree of correlation 
between the variables employed in this study. Moreover, our results are not influenced by the 
presence of multi-collinearity, in spite of the fact that the (uncentered) Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) computed after performing our regression model is high for certain variables 
(but never of our variable(s) of interest).  
3.2 Methods 
The results of the Hausman test (as well as a generalization of it, which compares the 
appropriateness of the random effects versus the fixed effects model and produces the Sargan-
Hansen statistic) strongly support the use of fixed effects over random effects regression 
models (p<0.001). Therefore, we use this model to test our hypothesis. However, this implies 
that time-invariant variables will be automatically removed when performing this regression 
model. In our sample, the brand notoriety variable does not vary over time, thus it is removed 
from the analysis when the fixed effects model is used. At any rate, we will consider it when 
checking robustness of our results by performing standard OLS regression models for each 
day of observation.  
As largely discussed in the extant literature (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004; 
Santalo and Becerra, 2008), potential endogeneity concerns may arise with regard to the 
relationship between the diversification decision and the sales performance ratio. Various 
authors have tried to address this problem by resorting to the instrumental variables (IVs) 
approach. For instance, Campa and Kedia (2002) utilize two sets of instruments, one related 
to industry characteristics such as industry attractiveness, and the other one capturing firm 
characteristics such as the presence in major exchange listings and the country of 
incorporation. However, more recently, Santalo and Becerra (2008) have questioned the 
exogeneity of this type of instruments, by showing that especially industry characteristics 
strongly influence the relationship between diversification and firm performance. As a result, 
the use of the IVs approach in this stream of study is limited by the difficulty to find 
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completely exogenous instruments. We recognize the existence of potential endogeneity 
concerns, but leave this issue for future improvements of the present study. 
4. Results and discussion 
Table 3 shows our major results of our empirical analysis based on the fixed effects 
regression model. In the first column, we check the impact of the only control variables alone. 
It is shown that past sales performance, developer concentration within category, and store 
sales growth rate are major factors influencing the category-adjusted developer sales 
performance ratio and they all have positive influence on it. In particular, the previous sales 
performance is strongly significant. In the second column, we add the diversification dummy 
and find that, while the significance and the sign of the above control variables remain 
unchanged, the effect of the diversification decision is largely not significant. Given that this 
result is derived under the full sample (which includes observations from both Apple’s App 
Store and Google Play), we cannot simply conclude that (at least based on our sample) there 
is no evidence to claim that diversified developers obtain a superior or inferior perfomance as 
compared with specialized developer. Indeed, as we have theorized, the effect of 
diversification on sales performance may be different between the two mobile app 
ecosystems. Failing to capture the diversity of the two major ecosystems might result in 
insignificant effects. Therefore to examine the effect of diversification on sales performance 
more accurately and capture the role of the platform ecosystem, we utilize two approaches. 
First, as anticipated earlier, we add to the model presented in the second column the 
interaction term between the diversification dummy and the store dummy. Second, we 
analyze the subsamples of developers in the Apple’s App Store and in Google Play 
separately. The results obtained under the first approach are reported in the third column of 
Table 3. After adding the interaction, we find that the coefficient of the diversification 
dummy, which now reflects the marginal change in the category-adjusted developer sales 
performance ratio due to diversification in Google Play, is largely significant (p<0.001). On 
the opposite, the coefficient of the interaction term, which instead reflects the marginal 
change in the category-adjusted developer sales performance ratio due to diversification in the 
Apple’s App Store, is largely insignificant. The regression analysis performed under the 
separate subsamples further confirms and strengthens this evidence. As a matter of fact, in the 
fourth column of Table 3, it is shown that the diversification dummy is positive and 
significant for the subsample drawn from Google Play. On the other hand, in the fifth column 
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of the same table, which reports the results for the subsample drawn from the Apple’s App 
Store, the coefficient of this dummy is once again largely insignificant. Overall, these results 
suggests that in Google Play diversified developers are associated with a better sales 
performance than specialized developers, whereas in the Apple’s App Store, there is no 
statistical evidence to claim that diversified developers differs from specialized developers in 
terms of sales performance. In turn, this suggests that the ecosystem where developers choose 
to commercialize their apps plays an important role in the sales performance implications of 
diversification. As we have argued, the two major ecosystems are characterized by large 
differences in average consumer willingness to pay (Ghose and Han, 2014). In Google Play, 
consumers have lower average willingness to pay. This implies that, in comparative terms, 
consumer are not willing to spend much on apps, thus discouraging developers from 
marketing high quality, which would require high prices. Therefore, to raise their sales 
developers operating in this store cannot count much on high margins. Rather they need to 
rely on capturing a large user base. In this environment, by diversifying their product offering 
and thus serving a multitude of consumer needs, developers can exploit the consumer base 
already installed for a certain app category also for other app categories, fueling the 
“bandwagon effect” in the diffusion of apps of the latter categories (Tanriverdi and Lee, 
2008). In contrast, specialized developers cannot take advantage of their installed consumer 
base, thus failing to activate this virtuous circle that propels sales. In addition, in Google Play 
they cannot counterbalance much this disadvantage with higher quality (and thus higher 
margin) apps due to specialization because consumers in this ecosystem are less inclined to 
pay high prices, as compared to the Apple’s App Store. As a result, as demonstrated by our 
results, in Google Play diversified developers perform better than specialized developers. In 
contrast, in the Apple’s App Store, specialization generates returns in terms of sales 
performance. Indeed, by means of specialization developers can build expertise that will 
allow them to develop and commercialize high quality apps. Given that consumers have 
relatively high willingness to pay in this store, they are more likely to recognize a price 
premium to high quality apps. As a result, the sales disadvantage of lower user base is likely 
to be compensated by the higher margins their apps can generate. Therefore, it is possible that 
in this platform ecosystem the sales performance of diversified developers does not differ 
from that of specialized developers significantly, as also suggested by our results. Overall, our 
results have an important implication for developers as they suggest that developers should 
factor in the app ecosystem where they operate when making the decision on whether to 
diversify or not.  
	 16	
We check the robustness of our results by performing OLS regression models for each day of 
observation. In particular, Table 4 reports the results of some representative models (when the 
days of observation are 9, 60, and 120). Once again, the results support the arguments above 
on the role of the platform ecosystem in the relationship between the sales performance and 
diversification. It is interesting that, in some circumstances, the effect of diversification on 
sales performance in the Apple’s App Store becomes negative and significant (though at the 
10% level of significance), suggesting the benefits of specialization dominates in these cases. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have contributed to the vast literature on the effects of diversification on 
firm performance by addressing this issue in the app market, where developers can diversify 
by marketing apps belonging to different categories (i.e., satisfying different sets of consumer 
needs), but still in the same competitive arena, i.e., the app store. More importantly, we have 
contributed to the extant literature by investigating the role of the platform ecosystem in the 
performance-diversification relationship. Applying the argument of Santalo and Becerra 
(2008) to the context of platform ecosystems, we have indeed argued that the effect 
diversification on sales performance hinges upon the distribution platform where the 
developer operates. In particular, the cross-platform differences in consumer willingness to 
pay provide the rationale behind the different effect of diversification on sales performance 
across different platform ecosystems. 
Our results show indeed that the diversification strategy has a positive impact on developer 
sales in Google Play, while no significant impact emerges in the Apple’s App Store. That is, 
diversified developers are associated with a better sales performance than specialized 
developers, whereas in the Apple’s App Store, diversified developers do not differ from 
specialized developers in terms of sales performance. We have explained that in the Apple’s 
App Store the benefits derived from specialization are sufficiently high because consumer 
have relatively high willingness to pay and they can afford to pay high prices, giving the 
incentive to developers to specialize in order to develop and market high quality apps. In 
contrast, in Google Play, because of the lower consumer willingness to pay, the benefits of 
specialization cannot counterbalance the benefits derived from diversification, such as the 
greater ability to capture a large user base by exploiting the installed user base for one app 
category also for other app categories served by the diversified developer. As a result, we find 
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that the inter-category diversification strategy raises developer sales performance in Google 
Play, but it does not yield different sales performance from a specialization strategy in the 
Apple’s App Store.  
This study has important implications for developers and platform owners. First, we inform 
developers that they should carefully assess the platform ecosystem where they operate before 
making diversification decisions as their decision to diversify across app categories is likely 
to have different consequences in terms of sales performance in different platforms. Second, 
our findings help increase distribution platform owners’ awareness on the role of the platform 
ecosystem factors in the relationship diversification-performance and rethink their strategies 
to attract both users and developers in order to improve platform profitability.  
There are of course some limitations in our study, which may however offer opportunities for 
improvements. First, similarly to recent studies focusing on information goods (Tanriverdi 
and Lee, 2008; Lee and Raghu, 2014), given the absence of cost information, we use sales as 
a measure of firm performance. Accordingly our arguments on the advantages and/or 
disadvantages of diversification reflect the implications of diversification on such measure of 
performance. However, to fully evaluate the effects of diversification on firm profitability, we 
should rely on a large survey to obtain cost information estimates. At any rate, the current 
study still allows us to make some further useful considerations. It is indeed well known that 
diversification comes at a cost. Therefore, if no benefits of diversification emerge in terms of 
sales performance (and this is the case of developers in the Apple’s App Store), we should 
expect a negative effect of diversification on firm profitability. When there are significant 
benefits of diversification (i.e., the case of developers in Google Play), then the knowledge of 
costs will tell us whether the diversification has a positive effect on firm profitability as well. 
At any rate, the different effect (in magnitude or in sign and magnitude) of diversification on 
firm performance across different ecosystems still remains. Second, as we have already 
pointed out, endogeneity concerns may arise with regard to the relationship between sales 
performance and diversification. While we have discussed the issues associated with the 
identification of appropriate IVs in this context, the present study would certainly benefit 
from resorting to this approach to mitigate the emergence of endogeneity, if any. Third, in 
spite of the laborious procedure to retrieve data and estimate developer revenue, the extension 
of our sample to a longer period of observation (e.g., several years) would improve the 
reliability of our findings. Finally, we draw some line for future research. For instance, in line 
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with Santalo and Becerra (2008), the investigation of how the effect of diversification on firm 
performance depends not only on the platform ecosystem but also on the app category is 
undoubtedly worthwhile.  
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Table 1. Variable descriptive statistics 
 Full sample Apple’s App Store sample Google Play sample 
 Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviations Mean 
Std. 
Deviations 
Category-adjusted 
Developer Sales 
Performance Ratio 
5.495 17.489 3.547 7.843 7.855 24.321 
Diversification 0.204 0.403 0.204 0.403 0.205 0.404 
Developer Sales 
(Euros) 27,443.94 61,523.42 37,598.81 76,299.09 15,151.2 32,314.04 
Store Sales (Euros) 5,722,023 2,778,037 8,242,415 222,457.5 2,671,021 33,227.34 
Store Sales Growth 
Rate 0.0006 0.014 0.0008 0.019 0.0004 0.003 
Developer Age 
(days) 687 451 867 500 469 247 
Brand Notoriety 0.167 0.373 0.157 0.364 0.178 0.382 
Category HHI 0.141 0.169 0.157 0.184 0.127 0.153 
 
 
Table 2. Correlation matrix 
 
Developer 
Prior Sales 
(Ln) 
Category 
HHI 
Stores Sales 
Growth Rate 
Developer 
Age (Ln) Diversification 
Category HHI -0.219*     
Stores Sales Growth 
Rate -0.002 0.001   
 
Developer Age (Ln) 0.229* 0.065* 0.000   
Diversification  0.182* 0.194* -0.000 0.259*  
Brand notoriety 0.411* 0.004 -0.000 0.158* 0.107* 
The symbol * indicates that the Pearson correlation coefficient is significant at p<0.05 
 
Table 2. Fixed effects regression models  
 
Full Sample 
only controls 
Full Sample 
with no 
Diversification
- Store 
interaction 
Full Sample 
with 
Diversification
- Store 
interaction 
Only Google 
Play sample 
Only Apple’s 
App Store 
sample 
Developer Prior Sales (Ln) 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.214*** 0.078*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.075) 
Category HHI 0.790* 0.784* 0.784* 0.417** 0.944* 
 (0.405) (0.409) (0.411) (0.191) (0.556) 
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Store Sales Growth Rate 0.150* 0.150* 0.150* 2.644 1.119* 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (4.207) (0.620) 
Developer Age (Ln) 0.038 0.038 0.038 -0.013 0.033 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.048) (0.051) 
Diversification   0.054 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.084 
  (0.048) (0.010) (0.008) (0.075) 
Diversification X Store   0.028   
   (0.056)   
Temporal Dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -1.161*** -1.171*** -1.170*** -1.576*** -1.202*** 
 (0.335) (0.333) (0.333) (0.352) (0.432) 
N of observations 42745 42745 42745 19322 23423 
N of developers-store pairs 385 385 385 176 209 
R2  within 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.281 0.097 
R2  between 0.694 0.689 0.680 0.816 0.690 
R2  overall 0.617 0.616 0.601 0.787 0.570 
Robust standard errors in parentheses - * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 2. Representative OLS regression models for cross-sectional samples 
 
Only Google 
Play 
Day 9 
Only Apple’s 
App Store 
Day 9 
Only Google 
Play 
Day 60 
Only Apple’s 
App Store 
Day 60 
Only Google 
Play 
Day 120 
Only Apple’s 
App Store 
Day 120 
Developer Prior 
Sales (Ln) 0.365*** 0.391*** 0.372*** 0.384*** 0.375*** 0.337*** 
 (0.092) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015) (0.017) (0.021) 
Category HHI 0.866*** 2.136*** 1.090*** 2.281*** 1.238*** 2.172*** 
 (0.092) (0.312) (0.193) (0.209) (0.192) (0.422) 
Developer Age (Ln) 0.048* 0.033 0.072*** -0.053* 0.025 -0.011 
 (0.025) (0.030) (0.021) (0.029) (0.032) (0.060) 
Brand Notoriety 0.077 0.047 0.073 0.041 0.076 0.076 
 (0.057) (0.089) (0.066) (0.071) (0.056) (0.075) 
Diversification  0.362*** -0.155* 0.310*** -0.003 0.283*** -0.138* 
 (0.090) (0.085) (0.096) (0.071) (0.092) (0.072) 
Constant -3.3666*** -4.004*** -3.617*** -3.441*** -3.375*** -3.314*** 
 (0.191) (0.196) (0.185) (0.227) (0.233) (0.400) 
N of observations 167 201 171 208 176 209 
R2  0.839 0.803 0.832 0.832 0.833 0.702 
Robust standard errors in parentheses - * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
